Introduction (*)
In twenty-first century global health, a key concern of international bodies such as the World Bank and the World Health Organisation (WHO) is the improvement of «health systems» 1 . Technical guides and batteries of statistical indicators are available to assist governments, advising them on funding mechanisms, stewardship of services and regulatory structures 2 . Underlying this is a burgeoning field of applied research, with its own scholarly journals and networks 3 . Yet, as the Ebola crisis of 2014-15 revealed, there are still parts of the world where administration and services remain fragile and population coverage incomplete 4 . Both its ubiquity and its persistence therefore make it worthwhile to interrogate the history of what we now call «health systems strengthening».
This though is a complex intellectual and policy history, entwining, inter alia, the disciplinary emergence of cybernetics and health services research and the activities of international organisations 5 . For some observers, it was in the 1970s when «health systems» thinking had its inception 6 . By this time articulations of medicine as a holistic structure had begun to appear, and scholars proffered different typologies for cross-national comparison, based on criteria like modes of funding and forms of hospital ownership 7 . They also delineated generic features that could be quantified and compared, thus to illuminate different national approaches to marshalling the inputs and processes of health care, and the outcomes these produced 8 . Emanating initially from medical sociology and epidemiology, early crossnational comparisons brought a «systems approach» to investigating the balance between primary care and hospital services and early attempts at mathematical system modelling also appeared 9 .
These conceptual and methodological initiatives were concurrent with the flowering of health systems work as a field of international health. A pivotal moment was the Alma Ata Conference of 1978, whose closing Declaration had pledged the WHO to extending primary health care to achieve «Health for all by the year 2000». Standard narratives treat this as a turning point in the priorities of the WHO, the United Nations agency with a special remit for health 10 . Up until then it had concentrated primarily on «vertical» interventions against major communicable diseases, notably the victorious campaign against smallpox, and the less successful Global Malaria Eradication Programme. Alma Ata represented a change of tack, partly in recognition of the need for better local infrastructure to support 6. Mills, A.J.; Ranson, M.; The design of health systems. In: Merson, M.H.; Black R.E.; Mills, A.J., eds.
International public health: diseases, programs, systems, and policies. the objectives of externally driven programmes, and partly from growing awareness that existing hospital-centric services in many low-income settings were inadequate to the needs of rural populations. This agenda of «horizontal» programming did not endure 11 . Resource constraints and political judgments in the early 1980s scaled back the universalist intent to focus on «selective» primary health care, with funding for a limited number of cost-effective interventions. Then came HIV/AIDS, and a reversion to vertical, diseasespecific programmes as the priority for international health 12 .
A more nuanced picture emerges from specialist historical studies, which note earlier «horizontal» initiatives by WHO to build national service capacity. These arose from Article 2 of WHO's Constitution, adopted at the International Health Conference of July 1946, which directed it «to assist governments, upon request, in strengthening health services» and to «study and report» on «administrative and social techniques» pertaining to «hospital services and social security» 13 . Some of this literature traces the precursors to the primary health care movement in local projects which sought to embed structures that would sustain vertical interventions 14 . Then there are the official histories of the WHO, which chronicle by decade the early approaches to health planning, and related country-level assistance. For example, volume 1 (1948-58) describes the committees concerned with «public health administration» and «organisation of medical services», noting their technical findings and advice 15 . In volume 2 (1958-67) the alignment of health services policy with programmes of economic development is noted, along with basic descriptions of planning initiatives in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East and various newly independent African nations 16 analysis to support country health programming. Analytically, it emphasises some of the inadequacies of the early efforts to provide basic health services, and the way these informed the new thinking of Alma Ata 17 . The institutional history of the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) also covers early regional planning, linking this to the development projects championed by the USA to counter the appeal of Communism 18 . Otherwise there are brief retrospectives, which conclude that the WHO «lagged behind other sectors» in planning methodologies, and that its ventures in the field, such as PAHO's, were unsuccessful 19 .
The aim of this article is to document this «prehistory» phase of the WHO's health systems work prior to Alma Ata, and to analyse the intellectual and political framework in which it emerged. It is based on documentary research in both the WHO's Geneva archive, and its online IRIS repository. With respect to unpublished sources and grey literature, we have made particular use of the WHO N5 series, which contains internal records of health planning initiatives. The other key source is WHO's Technical Assistance publication series, which contains material on health services planning, training of personnel and systems analysis. In addition, we made a very limited survey of British and American press reports, for factual context and a glimpse of external reaction.
The article extends existing accounts in several ways. First, it brings into view individuals and groups with shifting locations within the WHO that maintained an interest in services and financing, and the context in which their work was done. Second, it examines the evolving content of the WHO's thinking on technical assistance for health planning, showing its direct lineage with what later became systems analysis. Third, it argues that while the adoption of systems thinking was partly driven by new disciplines, it also served a political purpose, providing a neutral language in which the otherwise value-laden terrain of health policy could be debated during the Cold War. Two caveats must be entered. Although this essay includes discussion of one WHO-led country initiative, in Colombia, it does not pretend to address the history of health planning at national level. For this, there are many studies of health systems policy-making in the West, and a few, to which we will add in future, of planning or service development in post-colonial settings. Nor does it seek to explore the contributions to planning of the different regional offices of the WHO, although there is some discussion of PAHO's innovations 20 . Rather, the concern here is to illuminate the work of officials and external advisers at the agency's headquarters, in Geneva. This will give the exposition a somewhat Western-centric focus, for reasons that will become clear.
We begin by discussing the WHO's first decade, when health services were only a minor area of activity, but early advisory positions were staked out. The central sections focus first on the 1960s and the consolidation of «planning», with the influence of epidemiologists and social medicine to the fore, then the 1970s, when the dominant strategy became «systems analysis», a method that blended cybernetics and operational research. While we cannot offer a retrospective evaluation of these strategies, we conclude with some general observations about their achievements and limitations.
The early WHO: from social medicine to planning
Historians have already documented how the European tradition of social medicine, with its long-standing concern for health services, was marginalised during the early years of the WHO. Consensus amongst member states around questions of social security, financing and coverage was impossible, not least because the politics of «socialized medicine» were fiercely contentious in the United States 21 architect of the Swedish welfare state, early advocate of Keynesianism, and author of a seminal study of race in America, whose brand of internationalism appalled the US State Department 27 . In the ensuing «Technical Discussion», 120 delegates worked in polyglot, cross-national discussion groups to pool experiences of local service organisation 28 . The result was the establishment of a Committee on Organisation of Medical Care (COMC) to explore the «relationships between public health, medical care, and social security» 29 .
Its subsequent report advocated the general hospital as the fundamental building block of national «systems of health care», drawing on the then current Western model of regional integration of curative, recuperative and preventive functions 30 . The more substantial effort in the 1950s was that of the WHO Expert Committee on Public Health Administration (ECPHA). ECPHA's first report in 1952 established a platform for subsequent discussions by outlining at a generic level the diverse administrative functions of health authorities and the role of the state 31 . It also proselytised for change: «The authorities and functions of national, provincial, and local health administrations have not been clearly defined»; the integration of curative and preventive care was «not yet well established in most countries»; and «In general there is a lack of system in organising medical and health services» 32 . The committee's solution was to align all functions «under one system of health service», in which the state ensured coordination and smooth financing 33 . The ECPHA's next report, in 1954, moved further towards instruction, proposing a model health programme that could be extended locally through the «rural health unit». This would serve as a community «nucleus» for «basic health services» including the protection of maternal and child health, control of communicable disease, environmental and sanitary services, health education and medical care located in health centres and sub-centres. These would map onto existing political or administrative areas to integrate with other local services «e.g. education and agriculture» and would be staffed by at least one physician, complemented by a variety of auxiliary health workers 34 .
By 1961 however, the ECPHA began to focus on strategic national planning, rather than disseminating optimal structures. Committee members were asked «to pool their diverse experience» and «formulate some general principles for (...) drawing up long-term, flexible health plans» for countries at different stages of development 35 . Health services strengthening was to begin with planning, then continue with «organization, operation and evaluation (…) a continuous, dynamic operational process and not merely a starting-point» 36 . Planning would entail a comprehensive health survey to determine population health status and needs, then establish priorities for intervention. Next came the setting of targets and objectives, stakeholder consultation and the drafting of a national health plan. As before it advocated an active government policy, aiming for comprehensive services and broad population coverage 37 .
The first phase had therefore begun with experts conceiving of «systems» first as forms of organisation, though without consensus on the preferred model, and then as planning processes. What explains this? The ECPHA seems to have been a bastion of the surviving social medicine movement, and its early work carried forward an interwar agenda. It was initially chaired by the Norwegian Karl Evang, a pioneer of that country's welfare state, and included James Mackintosh, founder of the Society of Social Medicine, and Andrija Stampar, health centre advocate and veteran of the League of Nations Health Organisation (LNHO) 38 . Stampar's work in Yugoslavia with the LNHO had been the locus classicus of the rural health programme, combining health centre building and health education initiatives tailored to 41 Much in all this foreshadowed the «basic health services» agenda, which received widespread support in WHO in the 1970s, but it also sought to revive a past that was currently out of favour with the dominant member states 42 . The COMC's hospital-based model also had its roots in interwar thought, although this committee was politically more centrist. It included, for example Michael Bluestone, of New York's Montefiore Hospital, and was chaired by T.C. Routley of the conservative World Medical Association, which fiercely opposed social health insurance 43 . The core idea was hierarchical regionalism, premised on the spatial organisation of general hospitals around a central teaching hospital. This had emerged in the advanced industrial nations to integrate scientific expertise with the medical economy in the most rational and efficient way 44 . Some of the report, including its annex summarising the history of the hospital from classical times, echoed the sense of progressive inevitability evident in key social medicine texts 45 . On balance though, the experts on the COMC reflected the preoccupations of sophisticated health systems in rich countries, staking a neutral terrain that eschewed issues of financing, and was attuned to mainstream thought on the WHO's role 46 By the end of the 1950s these early approaches were giving way to a new paradigm of planning for development. A language of «human capital» entered ECPHA texts, aligning them with the general economic planning currently pursued in both mixed and socialist economies, and increasingly within the development framework. Underwriting these efforts were new technologies of measurement, by which IOs could depict «the state of health of the nation in relation to its social and economic development» 47 . ECPHA's secretariat was now joined by Satya Swaroop, the WHO statistician most engaged with the UN's «level of living index», through which nations would be ranked on a scale of development 48 . In sum, during this first phase, lack of consensus among the member states meant that health services work was only a modest part of the WHO's activity. Nonetheless, groups within the organisation built expertise within the area, drawing on interwar thinking, and by the start of the 1960s an emerging consensus around development promised new possibilities.
Health planning during the development decade
During the 1960s, «planning» was the mode through which international organisations discussed health services in the Global South against the backdrop of decolonisation. It was also the vector through which they were aligned with the broader strategies of the UN Development Decade, heralded by President Kennedy in 1961 to promote «a substantial increase in the rate of growth» along with «social advancement» 49 the US ran through the newly founded USAID (1961) 50 . Economic plans demonstrating systematic thought about resources and personnel, and subject to evaluation according to the increasingly definitive indicator, GNP, were the prime means through which states could access this largesse. From the perspective of the WHO, however, where vertical disease programmes still dominated the agenda, it was far from certain that health services planning was set to become «(… ) part of a comprehensive approach to the socio-economic development of a country» 51 . Advocates inside WHO therefore strove to set the agenda. There was a spate of major conferences and meetings on health planning, several of which were convened in the WHO Region for the Americas, but also These efforts unfolded against a confused backdrop, for, despite the consensus around the desirability of planning, there were very different views of what it entailed. Indeed, part of its appeal was that of a primarily technical discourse that could be widely deployed precisely because its political locus was unfixed. Planning had been instrumental in the recovery of post-war capitalism, through the Marshall Plan; it had bipartisan support in Britain's mixed economy, manifest in its welfare, employment and industrial policies; it was «the political religion of post-war Europe» 56 . On the other side of the Iron Curtain were the Five-Year Plans first devised in 1927-8 under Stalin to drive the Soviet command economy, later adopted by communist China and Eastern Europe, and apparently successful in speeding industrialisation 57 . For the rulers of newly independent African nations, development planning was resonant of purposeful modernisation, providing a language in which bids for financial aid could be articulated 58 .
In these circumstances, WHO officials positioned themselves as brokers of the different styles of planning that member states pursued. Their expert study refrained from endorsing a single optimal model. Instead it presented a range of national techniques from which others could learn, on the grounds that no one method was of proven superiority, and that all had common features 59 . The text therefore spanned approaches pursued in India, Sweden and Peru, devoting special mention to Soviet methods, and studiously including the United States, even while acknowledging it «has neither a comprehensive health policy nor a national health plan» 60 . Thus did «détente» over planning efface the more contentious ideological questions of redistribution and human rights which otherwise attended health systems policy.
However, as well as performing a balancing act acceptable to the member states, WHO officials sought to innovate, by endorsing and applying two distinct approaches which they then applied themselves. so-called PAHO/CENDES method, specific to Latin America, where the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) pioneered a technique named after the Centre for Development Studies (CENDES) at the Central University of Venezuela. The second was produced in Geneva, and was intended as a practical demonstration exercise for newly independent African nations seeking to include a health component in their medium-term economic development plans 61 . Put crudely, the former was more rigorous and precise in its use of quantitative data, while the latter was more pragmatic 62 . What was involved with each?
The PAHO/CENDES planning model drew on technical assistance from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), PAHO, and WHO 63 . Its philosophy was that planning was a «state of mind», not just a «method», whose core principle was to maximize technical and allocative efficiency 64 . Priority-setting was determined partly by cost-benefit analysis of different interventions, using indicators of disease prevalence, estimates of deaths prevented, and inventories of personnel, equipment, supplies and facilities. Partly it reflected societal choice. Planners would agree the weight attached to different problems, and the trade-offs between a general mortality reduction and a concentration on economically productive life years; ethics figured too, ensuring geographical equity 65 . Health plans for local «program areas» of 100,000-150,000 inhabitants would provide the basis for regional plans catering for around 250,000-600,000 inhabitants, which would in turn inform the national health plan 66 .
Despite its promising start the PAHO/CENDES approach was abandoned by the WHO at the end of the 1960s 67 . Several Latin American countries had quickly formed national health planning agencies, and over 2,500 professionals were eventually trained by PAHO 68 70 . This would train for more «dynamic» planning, conceptualising the health system holistically and alert to the different levels of government where implementation would occur. Social science analysis would treat «administrative and political factors not as «external features but rather (…) essential elements», sensitive to ethics, emotion and values 71 . However, it was slow to commence, only becoming fully operational in 1970, and suffered apathy from member states; by 1976 it had folded, possibly as a casualty of the turbulence in Chile that followed Pinochet's coup 72 .
The pragmatic approach, meanwhile, was trialled in five sub-Saharan African countries, Gabon, Liberia, Mali, Niger, and Sierra Leone, in which the WHO, with USAID funding, helped prepare ten-year national health plans 73 . The first step was to recruit and train suitable international experts; WHO achieved this, and the five Africa plans were written between 1965 and 1967 74 . As a generic model they bore strong similarity to that developed in 1961 by ECPHA, in that they proposed a four phase process: fact-finding; planning and implementation; evaluation; training and capacity-building for renewal of the cycle. Unlike PAHO/CENDES, they contained no rigorous attempt to quantify demand or cost-effectiveness, instead sketching a more loosely justified expansion of facilities and personnel to improve population coverage 75 .
The outcome was a worse failure than the PAHO/CENDES initiative. Early reports by WHO's Africa Regional Office (AFRO) revealed the plans had not been implemented, but «put away in filing cupboards» 76 . Within WHO there were then calls for rigorous outside evaluations, overruling pleas by African officials for light touch monitoring. These revealed at best a very partial attempt to fulfil the plans: for example, Niger had only invested onetenth of the sum planned for 1965-7, Mali had recruited only 4 new doctors, not 34, and Sierra Leone had undertaken no capital spending 77 . This episode exposed the limits of technocratic plans hatched in Geneva and shaped by Western preferences for hospital-centric systems, going back to the colonial era. There was not sufficient statistical capacity to make economic and demographic projections and no proper consideration was given to economic and political context. Questions of financial resourcing or of social security were entirely omitted: the plans simply projected continuous growth in investment, under an anticipated economic expansion that never occurred 78 .
Are there general explanations for this failure of 1960s health planning? In both Latin America and Africa, it is reasonable to observe that the economic development on which welfare growth was premised never came 79 . For the newly independent African nations, health planning was an external imposition, which proved as inappropriate as much economic development initiatives 80 . However, this was less true of Latin American nations, which had decolonised long before and had their own strong traditions of medical innovation and public health 81 . Why then did PAHO member states either fail to produce plans, or implement them at best partially? Official explanations were that the PAHO/ CENDES methodology was administratively and technically demanding, and despite the effort expended on capacity-building, staffing was insufficient 82 . Planners also proved unrealistic in assuming existing structures of health services could be easily reworked. Consequently, their efforts «remained more a theoretical affirmation than a practical accomplishment» 83 . Lack of concern for financial «feasibility» was one problem, and another was their detachment from harsh political realities. Events soon revealed that the «'formal' truth of the technician» was insufficient to influence the «instrumental thinking» of the policy-makers, who were often beholden to interest groups with very different objectives 84 . This was because health coverage was divided between the social security enjoyed by better paid workers, the private medical insurance of the wealthy, and the general public health system that provided for the rest. Mechanisms for either formal integration or co-ordinated administration were absent 85 . Vested interests opposed the redistributive implications, and there was unnecessary bureaucratic rivalry arising from «separate clienteles» 86 .
In light of all this, do the 1960s development plans therefore show the WHO as ultimately in thrall to great power interests? In some respects, this seems plausible, not least because the development project has since been heavily critiqued as an exercise in Western soft power 87 . The Africa plans evince marked continuities with the colonial development model favoured by departing imperialists, and ultimately failed thanks to their neglect of African realities 88 . Similarly, the genesis of the PAHO/CENDES work lay in the social and political tensions of the late 1950s, when a worsening economic situation in Latin America sparked anti-American sentiment, most dramatically in the Cuban Revolution (1959) 89 . Development therefore provided the channel for financial aid that would restore the United States' benign hegemony. In close succession, an Inter-American Development Bank (1959) was established; the Act of Bogota (1960) committed the Organisation of American States to «economic and social progress»; and the Charter of Punta del Este (1961) pledged financial and technical assistance from the US government and UN agencies 90 . Again, the geopolitical drivers set the context.
Yet in both cases, the WHO/PAHO actors worked within that context to advance their own agendas. In a series of interventions in 1960-61, PAHO's Chilean director, Abraham Horwitz, successfully fought to place health on the planning agenda, asserting its importance to productivity and steering the US to support of social reform 91 . As a result, health planning became functionally integrated with national economic plans, and indices like life expectancy and infant mortality were adopted alongside others, like adult literacy and per capita income, as markers of development 92 . The WHO Africa initiative exemplifies the same process, fulfilling the earlier aims of ECPHA to assert that health must run in tandem with development, and not be treated as an after effect. And it was representatives of recently independent African nations that made this case, like Sierra Leone's John Karefa-Smart, who became WHO's Assistant Director General (1965-70) and keenly advocated development funding 93 . Similarly, it was at the periphery that the PAHO/ CENDES method was devised, bringing a conceptual sophistication to health systems thinking that would not be revived until the 1990s.
The 1970s: From planning to systems analysis
By the early 1970s the language of health planning began to give way to «systems analysis» 94 . The impetus behind development had begun to fade, as conflict in Vietnam and Nigeria and disappointment with aid efforts in India fuelled growing pessimism 95 . Meanwhile the endgame of smallpox eradication, coupled with the now evident limitations of the malaria programme, began the shift towards horizontal interventions which would culminate in the Alma Ata Declaration. This became visible in a more active field policy of building up «basic health services», which in turn began to shift the public image of international health 96 . Local WHO projects sought to establish «networks of health centres and sub-centres» with appropriately trained staff, intended to integrate maternity and child health, preventive programmes and communicable disease control, particularly of tuberculosis and malaria 97 . Activists and clinicians now argued that neither single disease programmes, nor capital investment in hospitals or health centres, provided an integrated solution attuned to local needs. What was required was a holistic view of population requirements and appropriate programmes to address these 98 .
Despite this changing context, the member states had not delegated significantly greater leadership powers to the WHO. This was not for want of trying on the part of the Director-General. In the mid-60s, Candau had sought to establish a global observatory, endowing the WHO with a substantial research capacity well beyond its ad hoc technical assistance committees 99 .
President Kennedy had endorsed this idea of a «world centre for health and communications» shortly before his death, and the ambitious proposal went to the WHO's Seventeenth Assembly in 1964 100 . There was to be an institute located at the University of Edinburgh, with 400 scientists, and a $300 million budget, to provide epidemiological and biomedical research according to criteria of social need. However, this was rebuffed, and the following year Candau submitted a more limited version, pitched as a resource for developing countries «to frame rational and long-range health planning» 101 .
Despite this, the major powers, including Great Britain and the USA, voted it down 102 . Nominally the objection was to cost, bureaucracy and the separation of research from training, with the subtext that the focus on biomedical research risked undermining leading national universities in the West. For example, the British delegation to the WHO, led by the Chief Medical Officer, Sir George Godber, jealously protected the country's own research resources. It feared that the establishment of an institution in Edinburgh would detract from research conducted elsewhere in Britain, and that other countries would send «propagandists and favourites» rather than their best scientists, leading Britain to commit expert personnel it could ill-afford to lose. Institutions in Scotland were not informed about the delegation's decision, much to the chagrin of leading Scottish academics, who were conscious of the prestige such a research centre would bring 103 . However, developing countries such as Indonesia and Mali were also opposed, fearing a distraction from more pressing public health problems and a brain drain of scientific talent 104 . In the end Candau had to be satisfied with a small, in-house Division of Research in Epidemiology and Communications Sciences (RECS), established in 1967.
These developments were the context for WHO's Systems Analysis Project, begun in 1969 under Halfdan Mahler, the charismatic Dane who would be WHO's Director-General between 1973 and 1988. The initiative represented a broader shift within the technical assistance programme, which intensified the level and range of support offered to states, now under the banner of technical «co-operation» to signal a less hierarchical approach 105 . Between 1970 and 1975 WHO sponsored 26 systems analysis projects, all but one in the Global South, and geared towards different national or regional programmes 106 . WHO's Project team also produced a manual in 1974, which provided Ministries of Health with step-by-step guidance. This steered planners through the phases of problem formulation, preliminary analysis, objective-setting, implementation and creating sustainable control structures 107 . An Expert Committee on Systems Analysis in Health Management was then established, containing representatives from the US, USSR, Africa, Asia and Europe, as well as from the World Bank and other organisations 108 .
This Committee, and the related technical reports, illuminate some of the antecedents and purpose of the «systems» approach, which, despite the novel label, bore strong likenesses to the WHO's earlier work. By the late-1960s another Expert Committee, on National Health Planning in Developing Countries, had embodied an organisational consensus that the WHO should offer practical advice, training schemes, «norms» of provision and the requisite data 109 . As the shortcomings of the Africa planning episode became apparent, so the focus moved to more logistical questions; this had led to a new Expert Committee on Training in National Health Planning (1969), chaired by Lopes da Costa of the School of Public Health, Rio de Janeiro 110 . Reporting in 1970, it articulated a systems-based approach to planning, with discrete inputs, processes and outputs, as the basis for training. This conceptual shift paralleled the contemporary attempt of the Expert Committee on Health Statistics (1969) to formulate a compendium of health service statistics encompassing financing (inputs), utilisation (processes), and outcomes (outputs) 111 . In some respects then, these cumulative activities in the fields of health planning, training and metrics laid the foundation for considering healthcare as a complex system.
The Systems Analysis Project also reflected the changing skills and backgrounds of WHO officials. Hitherto, the planning agenda had been taken forward largely by clinicians qualified in public health, or in the fledgling area of «health services research». In the late 1960s a new breed entered the field, versed in the current management sciences of industry and public policy: cybernetics and operational research. This was particularly evident in RECS, which was initially composed of 26 scientists engaged in epidemiology, mathematical modelling and operational research techniques 112 . These were not entirely technocratic developments, for systems analysis also incorporated figures embodying WHO's social medicine lineage. The Expert Committee was chaired by Sir John Brotherston, Chief Medical Officer for Scotland and a key progressive figure, while the Fabian socialist Brian Abel-Smith had sat on the 1967 Expert Committee and was instrumental in harmonizing health system statistics 113 . However, the recruitment of operational researchers like Socrates Litsios and subsequently Dev Ray, brought a different and more contemporary skill set.
The idea of systems analysis also drew on a new body of theory. It denoted a formalised approach to problem solving, by understanding complex phenomena as «systems», considered both holistically and in dynamic interrelation with their constituent parts and subsystems. This facilitated rational decisions under conditions of uncertainty: «a systematic examination of a problem of choice in which each step of the analysis is made explicit wherever possible» 114 . It had a conceptual foundation, propounded by scholars such as the Austrian biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy, whose «general systems theory» claimed to reveal underlying symmetries and structures in the natural world. In fields as diverse as theoretical physics, psychology and even history, systems theory proffered a ready supply of analogues that could transcend academic specialism, and reduce complexity to a series of common principles 115 . Practically though, it emerged from operational research during the Second World War, which applied quantitative and probabilistic methods to problems of military logistics, like maximizing the efficacy of weapons 116 . After the war it was the American RAND Corporation (a non-profit think tank spun off from the 'Research and Development' section of the Douglas Aircraft Company) that began to apply systems analysis in peacetime, initially contracting with the United States Air Force, then advising government on public and social policy 117 .
In the context of the WHO, systems analysis refreshed the presentation of the planning process. Health systems could now be conceived in organic terms, «such as a flower or a forest», with interacting component parts to which calculable change could be applied 118 . The approach had a «common logic» that was «content-neutral», a tool which empowered the user, rather than a prescription handed down 119 . Planning could now be led by health outcome goals, and the system elements quantified, particularly through «effectiveness indicators» to maximise resources 120 . Application could be at either a national or local level of programming, but the ambition was to provide a «scientific basis» to health policy-making and targeting aid 121 .
However, in the era of detente, it was the rhetoric of systems analysis that mattered. Because it was, explicitly, a «content-free way of thinking», in which cost/benefit and effectiveness were integral, it could sidestep initial political contentiousness en route to «a considerable amount of reform» 122 . This flexibility of systems analysis within international discourse is nicely illustrated by the presence on the WHO Expert Committee of advisers from the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 123 . IIASA had been founded in 1972 as a scientific forum where nations could set aside Cold War hostilities and co-operate on areas of global concern, such as the environment, the oceans and energy. 124 . Because scale and interdependence were common issues, systems analysis entered the discourse both from its Soviet military application and from global economic modelling 125 . Although management science, operations research, policy analysis and cybernetics were also touted as the organisation's purpose, the umbrella term «applied systems analysis» was adopted. According to IIASA's first director, its appeal was that «...nobody will know what it means and then we'll have a clean slate» 126 . It was neutral, technocratic and opaque, providing a banner for convening interdisciplinary, cross-national participants 127 . Its «method» was essentially a stepped policy-making programme: problem formulation; response identification; predictive modelling and assessment of options; then implementation and evaluation 128 . Thus it could proffer generic advice that was acceptable on either side of the Iron Curtain.
So much for the theory. What about the application by WHO in the field? Within RECS, the Organisation and Strategy of Health Services (OSHS) section led various research projects that aimed to translate this abstract, quantitative approach into an «operationally significant» form 129 . Of particular importance was a project in Colombia, conceived as a 5-10 year programme that would «develop, test and propagate a comprehensive health planning system» making available «new mathematical, decision analysis and managerial techniques» 130 . This was institutionally separate from the systems analysis project, though closely related in its attempt to derive a generally applicable planning model. It would ultimately be unsuccessful, but in the process it would provide important lessons about the realities of health planning.
It began in 1968, when Dr Gabriel Velásquez Palau, Dean of the Division of Health Services at the Universidad del Valle formally requested the assistance of RECS in establishing a new collaborative research programme in his region 131 . Valle, with its main city Cali, was considered of ideal size and structure for a pilot study 132 . The Colombian initiative also built on existing strengths, for its government had previously worked with PAHO and the US Milbank Memorial Fund on a national survey of health manpower and medical education, used subsequently in the reorganisation of Colombia's public health sector 133 . In WHO's judgment though the connection between development and health planning was still only «a well accepted theoretical concept to which (…) lip-service has been paid» 134 . Now the Colombian Comprehensive Health Planning Project (COLINPLAS), launched in July 1970, would develop a planning system for the region that could be scaled up to the entire nation 135 .
Thus conceived as a global laboratory, COLINPLAS mobilised an international research consortium, including experts from WHO, and PAHO, and academic consultants such as health system experts Kerr White and Vincente Navarro (Johns Hopkins), decision analyst and simulation modeller Richard Smallwood (Stanford), and the economist Dieter Zschock (Stony Brook). Grants to RECS were provided by the Milbank Memorial Fund, and to the Universidad del Valle by the Rockefeller Foundation. A related study of decision making in the Colombian Ministry of Public Health was led by Anthony Ugalde, a sociologist at the University of New Mexico. WHO played a central coordinating role, providing officials to the core planning team in Cali 136 .
Before long, however, the challenges and «impossible expectations» of planning health in Colombia became apparent 137 . The intricacy of the project, with its co-operative, multidisciplinary and multi-institutional character, introduced considerable administrative complexity and problems of communication. Organisation was sometimes poor and the number of consultants, while initially a boon, soon inundated the Cali field team 138 . Tensions arose with competing planning projects in Colombia such as a PAHO/CENDES initiative in Antioquia, and existing national health planning in Bogotá, against which COLINPLAS was «inhibitory» 139 . There was also considerable political instability, including a student occupation of the office where the project was based. This came to a head in the 1970 presidential election, unsuccessfully contested by the former dictator General Rojas Pinilla; significant unrest, and a threatened military coup, further destabilised the COLINPLAS programme 140 .
Although no evaluation survives of the project's accomplishments in Valle, the documents reveal a larger disappointment. The aim of creating a generic systems analysis model that could be scaled up nationally was not met, and the accompanying commentaries suggest several reasons. For comprehensive health planning to work, close co-operation between relevant state agencies was needed, but poor coordination between the Ministry of Health and Social Security Institute meant that budgeting practices were opaque. Matters were not helped by political upheaval following the 1970 presidential election, when the Minister of Health was replaced by a less sympathetic conservative. Ugalde's ethnography of the machinations of Colombian policy-making captured a prevailing mood of anxiety, reporting a strike of hospital residents and then the elections preoccupying health officials 141 . Here was the first close insight for WHO into «… planning health services in the 'real world' of people, patients, physicians, and politicians» 142 . Though generally pessimistic, Ugalde felt that the health demands of the Colombian public were articulated by its labour movement, free press, and political parties, and partially translated into policy by relatively conscientious decision-makers. But he concluded that there was a «vicious circle» of poor implementation at the centre, which in turn bred disillusion, and disinterest in data and evaluation 143 .
So, to summarise, in the early 1970s, eclectic planning approaches were replaced by the aspiration to develop a single, multi-purpose «systems analysis» model that would be generally applicable. Though buoyed by new disciplines and techniques, there was considerable continuity with what had gone before. The language of systems also appealed because it was technocratic, allowing the planning process to be conceived in isolation from the politics of resourcing and implementation. The elaborate and impressive RECS initiative revealed what could happen to systems analysis in the real world. However elegant a national health plan might be, if it was to succeed a state needed effective, sustainable policy-making machinery.
Conclusion
This article has explored the early history of international engagement with health services (later «systems») strengthening. It adds to the critical historiography of the WHO, in which the initial emphasis on vertical programmes over local capacity-building is well established. It argues that despite the political considerations that side-lined the European social medicine tradition, its ideals did survive in work on health planning. However, because conservative American sensibilities and those of the colonial powers found it contentious, discussion of social security, health rights and universal coverage were omitted from these first planning ventures. What remained was a consensual area of discourse, concerned initially with recommending Western models of organisation and administration, then increasingly focused on planning techniques as an aspect of statecraft. In the 1960s such practices were elaborated as an element of economic development plans, with refinement of methods for estimating population needs and gauging infrastructure and labour force requirements. However, these efforts were entangled with soft power objectives on the part of the West, and proved unsuccessful in the field, not least because they ignored issues of financing and capacity. Although the subsequent systems analysis approach had a distinctive theoretical foundation, and drew on new disciplinary expertise, it was rooted in these earlier planning efforts. Like them it provided a neutral, apolitical terrain in which health policy could be discussed, but it too foundered when trialled in real world settings for which its technocratic models could not account. Yet, within these larger constraints, the WHO did sustain a community of experts who produced policies that went beyond the positions of the leading member states. The discourses of planning and systems analysis in which these were framed were dry and managerial, but they contributed to the course of international health policy-making in several ways. First, they established the principle that health improvement must be treated as a contributory element of development and not as one of its outcomes. Second, by their nature they argued that state agency mattered, and that governments had a duty of stewardship over their citizens' health services. Third, while they could not claim much success, in their failings they opened up questions that would be salient for the future: what forms of financing might practically be introduced?; how should demand be articulated by the community being served?; and how could member states establish effective health policy-making mechanisms?
In these ways, the early health planners in Geneva, along with their transnational network, contributed to practices of health system strengthening that would develop further in the later twentieth century. Going forward, our research aims to move beyond the narrow technocratic focus of this article,
